International Crisis Group take on Iraq

I'll start with something fairly simple, just to get in the habit of this blog. A think-tank called the International Crisis Group (ICG) did two reports on the Sunni's apparent switch-over from the insurgency.

The first dealt the Sunnis themselves. The reports acknowledges the improved counter-insurgency capabilities of US forces but points out that much of the Sunni tribes change was in response to the high-handedness and brutality of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). The US push against AQI did facilitate this in that its damage to AQI leadership did lead to a breakdown in discipline, however AQI's agenda would seem to have put it on a collision course with the Sunni tribes notwithstanding. Specifically, its methodology and the clash between its ambition of an Islamic state and Sunni nationalism.

The report continued to argue that the tactical changes are potentially transient and contingent upon the long-term political fixes that the surge. Further, the arming of Sunni tribes creates a more powerful non-state actor--a potentially huge complication should the current marriage of convenience break down.

At best, the surge's ostensible success would seem to have consisted of facilitating independently existing developments; at worst, it has produced strategically barren gains.

The strategic aim of the surge was to provide a space that would permit a political solution among the Iraq factions. The claims of its success based on the very real reduction in violence confound means and ends. This may very well be consistent with what I suspect is the unspoken political aim of the surge, which was to get the Iraq issue of the front pages until after the election.